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THE POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE TO RESTRICT THE
INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL OF AMERICAN CITIZENS ON
NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY GROUNDS
INTRODUCTION
The right to travel is part of the "liberty" of which a citizen
cannot be deprived without due process of law under the fifth
amendment.1 This principle is not limited to travel from state to
state within the United States, but extends to travel abroad as
well. The right to international travel has been held, in theory at
least, to be no less an attribute of personal liberty than the right to
interstate travel.2 In practice, however, the courts have not been
inclined to view the freedom to travel outside the United States to
be inviolate or unqualified. Rather, in contrast to the right to in-
terstate travel, the right to international travel has been consid-
ered to be no more than an aspect of the "liberty" protected by the
due process clause of the fifth amendment.3 As such, this "liberty"
can be regulated within the bounds of due process.
4
The very nature of international travel itself engenders, in
part, what the government views as the need for regulation. The
uninhibited movement of Americans within the volatile interna-
tional arena may frustrate the President's efforts to conduct for-
eign affairs and maintain stable relations with other nations. More-
over, regulation of international travel may be considered to be
required not only to prevent interference with the conduct of for-
eign policy, but also to protect travelers from physical harm5 in
1. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).
2. See Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445, 451 (D.D.C. 1952). See also Boudin, The
Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 47, 49 (1956). The Supreme Court in
Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978), (discussed below) recently delineated the "cru-
cial difference" between the two freedoms of international and interstate travel. This differ-
ence goes to the degree of constitutional protection afforded these rights, and consequently
to the standards applied in evaluating restrictions thereon.
3. The Court in Aznavorian relied on the reasoning of Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) in drawing this distinction between
the rights of interstate and international travel.
4. See Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4 n.6 (1977).




areas where political and social upheaval prevail or where armed
hostilities are in progress. In light of these considerations, the in-
terest of the President, acting through the Secretary of State, in
maintaining some degree of control over the worldwide travel of
Americans becomes evident. The means for the Executive to exer-
cise such control is generally through the regulation of passports
pursuant to purported delegations of congressional authority. Reli-
ance is also placed on the Executive's constitutional responsibility
to conduct foreign policy. This Comment begins with an examina-
tion of the constitutional status of the right to international travel.
Subsequent discussion focuses on the principle decisions which
provide the proper mode of analysis for determining whether Con-
gress has delegated to the Executive Branch the authority to deny
or revoke a passport on national security grounds. The final Sec-
tion examines the most recent Supreme Court case in this area
which departs from earlier decisions of the Court and confers
sweeping power on the Executive to restrict the international
travel of Americans where such travel is deemed harmful to the
national security and foreign policy of the United States.
I. THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL ABROAD
The United States Constitution contains no express language
providing for a right to international travel. Despite this fact, the
United States Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have
been uniform in holding that the right to travel abroad is deserving
of constitutional protection.' The Supreme Court first recognized
6. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378
U.S. 500 (1964); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(concurring opinion of Stewart, J. and dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.); Califano v.
Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978); Schactman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Wor-
thy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Worthy v. United States, 328 F.2d 386 (5th Cir.
1964); Lynd v. Rusk, 389 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Berrigan v. Sigler, 499 F.2d 514 (D.C.
Cir. 1974). See also Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952); Boudin v. Dulles, 136
F. Supp. 218 (D.D.C. 1955); MacEwan v. Rusk, 228 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Pa. 1964), affd, 344
F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1965); Woodward v. Rogers, 344 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1972), afl'd, 486
F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Bauer is considered to be the first case in which a federal court
found the freedom to travel abroad to be an aspect of "liberty" protected by due process
clause of the fifth amendment. In comparing the right to international travel to the right to
interstate travel, the court reasoned that it is difficult to see where the freedom to travel
ouside the United States is any less an attribute of personal liberty. See also Boudin, supra
note 2 at 47, 49, 56.
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the status of this right in Kent v. Dulles. There, the Court ruled
that Congress had not granted the Secretary of State the authority
to promulgate regulations8 providing that no passport could be is-
sued to Americans who were Communist Party members. Justice
Douglas, writing for the Court, found that:
The right to travel is part of the liberty which the citizen cannot be deprived
of without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. . . . Freedom of
movement across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as well,
was a part of our heritage. Travel may be necessary for a livelihood. It may'
be as close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats or
wears, or reads. Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values ....
Freedom to travel is indeed an important aspect of the citizen's liberty.9
While Kent embodied a recognition of the right to interna-
tional travel, a later decision resulted in some confusion with re-
gard to the source of that right. The Supreme Court's reasoning in
Aptheker v. Secretary of State10 caused some to believe that the
Court was adopting the theory that the right to travel abroad was
founded in the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech
and association. In Aptheker the Court was concerned with the va-
lidity of Section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act.11 That
provision prohibited members of Communist organizations who
were required to register with the Subversive Activities Control
Board from knowingly applying for, using, or attempting to use a
passport. Section 6 rendered irrelevant the member's degree of ac-
tivity in the Communist Party and established an irrebuttable pre-
sumption that individuals who were members of the specified orga-
nizations will, if given passports, engage in activities inimical to
the security of the United States.1 2 Citing Kent, the Court reiter-
ated that the right to travel abroad is an important aspect of the
citizen's "liberty" guaranteed by the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. 3 In evaluating the validity of Section 6, the Court
7. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
8. 22 C.F.R. § 51.135 (1952); 22 C.F.R. § 51.142 (1952). Relying on these regulations, the
Secretary of State denied the passport applications of two individuals-Rockwell Kent and
Dr. Walter Briehl-because each refused to file an affidavit concerning his membership in
the Communist Party.
9. 357 U.S. at 125-26.
10. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
11. 50 U.S.C. § 785.
12. 378 U.S. at 511. Section 6 operated to prohibit travel abroad for any member of
specified organizations regardless of the purposes for which the individual wished to travel.
13. Id. at 505.
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recognized that anyone falling within the Act would have to aban-
don their membership in order to regain their freedom to travel.
While the government argued that such an alternative lessened the
restrictive effect of the legislation, 4 Justice Goldberg, writing for
the Court, found otherwise and held:
Since freedom of association is itself guaranteed in the First Amendment,
restrictions imposed on the right to travel cannot be dismissed by asserting
that the right to travel could be fully exercised if the individual would first
yield up his membership in a given association. 5
Determining "that Congress [had] within its power 'less dras-
tic' means of achieving the congressional objective of safeguarding
our national security,""6 the Court held that Section 6 was uncon-
stitutional on its face.17 However, the Court went on to conclude
that the freedom to travel is a constitutional liberty closely related
to rights of free speech and association and applied first amend-
ment standards of review.'8 One interpretation of Aptheker is that
some members of the Court adopted the view that the right to
travel, being a personal rather than a property right, is entitled to
protection under the fifth amendment commensurate with protec-
tion afforded rights of expression and association under the first
amendment.19 However, the more widely accepted interpretation of
Aptheker is that the Court merely recognized that first amend-
ment rights are related to the right to travel in certain specific sit-
uations such as where a citizen's enjoyment of liberty to travel is
contingent on the abandonment of the first amendment right of
association.20 Thus, the relationship of freedom to travel abroad
with first amendment rights appears to be limited to instances
where a violation of first amendment rights is the primary wrong
14. Id. at 507.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 512-13. With respect to the notion that Congress had less drastic means to
implement its objective, Justice Goldberg adopted as controlling the language of Justice
Stewart in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), where it was held: "[Elven though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved." Id. at 488.
17. 378 U.S. at 514. Justice Goldberg reasoned that the challenged "section, judged by
its plain import and by the substantive evil which Congress sought to control, sweeps too
widely and indiscriminately across the liberty guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment."
18. Id. at 517.
19. See Note, The Right to Travel Abroad, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 838, 842 (1974).
20. Id. at 843.
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visited upon the prospective traveler and not where travel alone is
infringed.
In 1965 the Supreme Court, in Zemel v. Rusk,21 reinforced this
interpretation of Aptheker and clearly rejected the notion of a sub-
stantive right to international travel involving first amendment
considerations. In Zemel a United States citizen's request to have
his passport validated for travel to Cuba was denied pursuant to a
State Department's travel ban to that country. The appellant ar-
gued that the State Department's area restriction was violative of
the first amendment right of citizens to ". . travel abroad so that
they might acquaint themselves at first hand with the effects of
our government's policies, foreign and domestic and with condi-
tions abroad which might effect such policies. '22 While conceding
that the travel ban to Cuba restricted the flow of information con-
cerning that country, and that such a restriction should be consid-
ered in determining if the appellant has been afforded due process
of law, the Court held that:
[W]e cannot accept the contention of appellant that it is a First Amendment
right which is involved. For to the extent that the Secretary's refusal to vali-
date passports to Cuba acts as an inhibition (and it would be unrealistic to
assume that it does not), it is an inhibition of action. There are few restric-
tions on action which could not be clothed with ingenious argument in the
garb of decreased data flow .... The right to speak and publish does not
carry with it an unrestricted right to gather information.
23
The Zemel Court distinguished Aptheker on the grounds that
the refusal to validate Zemel's passport did not result from any
expression or association on his part. He was not being forced to
choose between his membership in an organization and his free-
dom to travel.24 Thus, the Court rejected the argument that the
right to international travel was based on the first amendment, and
limited Aptheker to its facts.
In his dissenting opinion in Zemel, Justice Douglas argued, as
he had done in Aptheker, that the right to international travel is
at the "periphery" of the first amendment.25 Such a finding was
21. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
22. Id. at 16.
23. Id. at 16-17.
24. Id. at 16.
25. Id. at 26. That concept is illustrated by Justice Douglas in the following language:
Freedom of movement is kin to the right of assembly and to the right of associa-
tion. These rights may not be abridged ... only illegal conduct being within the
1981]
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based on the recognition that "the right to know, to converse with
others, to consult with them, to observe social, physical, political
and other phenomena abroad, as well as at home, gives meaning
and substance to freedom of expresson and freedom of the
press. ' ' 28 However, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts
have repeatedly held that the liberty to travel abroad is only a fifth
amendment right.2 7 Consistent with this finding, the District Court
for the District of Columbia has held that the right to travel
abroad is not a right to think or speak, it is a right to be physically
present in a certain place.28 Infringements on the right to travel
involve actual inhibition of one's freedom of movement. As such,
the international travel right is limited in scope and its protection
does not extend to the freedoms of speech and association. Thus,
even if speech is contemplated by a traveler at his destination, the
right to travel abroad is still governed by fifth amendment due
process considerations.2 9 The freedom to travel internationally,
however, is a distinct substantive right.
The Supreme Court recently compared the right to travel
abroad with the right to interstate travel in Califano v.
Aznavorian.30 The Court stated:
purview of crime in the constitutional sense. War may be the occasion for serious
curtailment of liberty. Absent war, I see no way to keep a citizen from traveling
within or without a country unless there is power to detain him. And no author-
ity to detain him exists except under extreme conditions . . . .The freedom of
movement is the very essence of our society, setting us apart.
Id. at 26, (Douglas, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 24.
27. See, e.g., Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978); Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170
(1978); Lynd v. Rusk, 389 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Berrigan v. Sigler, 499 F.2d 514 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Woodward v. Rogers, 344 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1972), af'd, 486 F.2d 1317 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). These cases adopted the view of the Zemel majority and contain express state-
ments to the effect that the right to travel abroad is protected by the due process clause of
the fifth amendment.
28. See MacEwan v. Rusk, 228 F. Supp. 306, 309 (E.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 963
(3d Cir. 1965).
29. See Berrigan v. Sigler, 499 F.2d 514, 519-20 (D.C. Cir. 1974) where the court found:
Association, as well as speech, always is to be expected and, indeed, may be
inevitable at the [traveler's] destination, but this does not render invalid legiti-
mate restrictions upon travel for any such reason .... [Tihe enforcement of
legitimate regulations must not be diluted or rendered impractical because as an
incident to their application, speaking, association or writing may be effected.
Id.
30. 439 U.S. 170 (1978). In Califano v. Aznavorian the Court held that a provision of
the Social Security Act depriving a recipient of the right to Supplemental Security Income
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The Constitutional right to interstate travel is virtually unqualified. . . . By
contrast, the 'right' of international travel has been considered to be no more
than an aspect of the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. As such, this 'right' . . can be regulated within the
bounds of due process.
31
The right to interstate travel is an incident of national citizen-
ship3 2 and has been held to be among the "[p]rivileges and immu-
nities of citizens of the United States [which] arise out of the na-
ture and essential character of the national government."33 Thus,
while both the freedom of international and interstate travel may
have attributes of personal liberty,3 4 interstate travel is afforded a
greater measure of constitutional protection. While the ability to
travel abroad without unreasonable governmental restriction is an
important part of the citizen's freedom, it is not a fundamental
right.
II. RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL ABROAD AND
STANDARDS FOR REVIEW
The acceptance of the right to international travel as an
unenumerated liberty protected by substantive due process 3
5 im-
plies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reason-
able regulation. As Chief Justice Hughes once held: "[1]iberty
under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints
of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its
subject and adopted in the interest of the community is due
process.
'37
Regulation of international travel has been found reasonable
where its exercise was held to be justified in the national interest
on the basis of foreign policy considerations. In MacEwan v.
benefits for any month during all of which the recipient was outside the United States did
not violate the right to international travel. See text accompanying notes 49-56 infra.
31. 439 U.S. at 176.
32. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 166, 178 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring).
33. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 35, 44 (1867).
34. See note 6 supra.
35. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW, 570 (1978). Professor Tribe main-
tains that the "Bill of Rights presume the existence of a substantial body of rights not
specifically enumerated but easily perceived in the broad concept of liberty. .. ."
36. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1910).
37. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
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Rusk, 8 the President, acting through the Secretary of State, im-
posed travel restrictions to Cuba where the plaintiff had sought to
travel. The court held that the right to international travel is sur-
rounded by "innumerable restrictions" which may be governmen-
tal as well as personal or private.3 9 The court went on to find that:
National interest may require that American citizens be excluded from a
specified area at a particular time for their own protection as well as to pre-
vent their interference with the proper conduct [by the Executive] of Ameri-
can foreign policy ... the reasonableness of restrictions on travel to Cuba, if
the inherent power exists, can hardlo be questioned.0
The court then proceeded to determine that, incident to his
duty to conduct foreign affairs, the President did have inherent
power to prevent travel by American citizens to countries where
their presence might jeopardize the relations of the United States
with foreign countries.41 However, in Lynd v. Rusk,'2 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected the notion that the
Executive had such inherent authority. Noting that in Zemel the
Supreme Court did not predicate its decision on that ground,43 the
court of appeals reasoned that any claim of inherent authority
would run afoul of the Supreme Court's warning in Kent that, as
freedom to travel is part of the liberty protected by the fifth
amendment, "if that 'liberty' is to be regulated, it must be pursu-
ant to the law-making functions of the Congress." Where regula-
tion meets that requirement, has a substantial "relation" to the
Executive's "legitimate objective" of conducting foreign affairs,
and that objective is sought in the interest of public welfare,'45 the
essentials of due process are satisfied.
In Kent the Supreme Court warned that where a restriction
on the right to travel abroad results from delegated powers, the
38. 228 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1965).
39. 228 F. Supp. at 308.
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Id.
42. 389 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
43. See text accompanying note 108 infra.
44. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958).
45. See Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445, 451 (D.D.C. 1952), where the court held:
'Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an or-
ganized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be
lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses.' Thus, freedom to travel abroad, like
other rights, is subject to reasonable regulation and control in the interest of the
public welfare. [footnotes omitted].
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statute authorizing such restrictions will be narrowly construed."
However, while the Court recognized that the freedom to travel
internationally is an important aspect of a citizen's "liberty", it
"did not decide the extent to which it can be curtailed .. . [but
only] the extent . . to which Congress [had] authorized its cur-
tailment. 47 The Court did not reach the constitutional issue of
whether the petitioner's right to travel had been infringed, but
merely held that Congress had not delegated to the Secretary the
authority to deny passports on the basis of an applicant's political
beliefs or associations." Therefore, standards for evaluating re-
strictions on the freedom to travel abroad were neither prescribed
nor employed.
In Califano v. Aznavorian the Supreme Court rejected the ar-
gument that a statutory provision which may be valid under tradi-
tional due process criteria of reasonableness, should be judged by a
more stringent standard because of its restrictive effect on interna-
tional travel.49 This argument was predicated on Aznavorian's posi-
tion that the freedom to international travel is basically equivalent
to the right of interstate travel.5 In that case, the Court ruled that
section 1611(f) of the Social Security Act,51 which provides that no
benefits are to be paid under the Supplemental Security Income
program for any month in which a recipient was outside the
United States, did not impermissibly burden the freedom to travel
internationally. The Court reasoned that legislation which alleg-
edly infringes upon the right to travel abroad "is not to be judged
by the same standards applied to laws [which restrict] the right of
interstate travel. ' 52 Justice Stewart, however, was not entirely con-
sistent in his reasoning. At one point in his opinion for the Court,
he maintained that: "[u]nless the limitation imposed by Congress
is wholly irrational, it is constitutional in spite of its incidental
effect on international travel. ' 53 Justice Marshall, in a concurring
.46. 357 U.S. at 129.
47. Id. at 127.
48. The Court found that Congress, in enacting the Passport Act of 1926 and § 215 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, did "not delegate to the Secretary of State the
kind of authority exercised. .. ."
49. See Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 175 (1978).
50. Id. at 176. See also text accompanying note 31 supra.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(f).
52. 439 U.S. at 177.
53. Id. (emphasis added).
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opinion joined by Justice Brennan, found the use of the phrase
"wholly irrational" to be unfortunate in that it implies that welfare
legislation is subject to a lesser standard of review than the ra-
tional basis test since fundamental interests or suspect classifica-
tions were not involved.' A possible explanation for the use of lan-
guage that implies the application of a less stringent standard than
"reasonableness" may be that it was used in an evaluation of legis-
lation that had only an "incidental effect on international travel. '55
It is noteworthy that Justice Stewart returned to traditional lan-
guage at the close of his opinion in concluding that the constitu-
tionality of the challenged provision did "not depend on compel-
ling justifications. It is enough if [it] is rationally based.""
It is apparent that the Court will not evaluate restrictions on
international travel with standards applicable to fundamental
rights. Aznavorian cleared up confusion caused by the Court's reli-
ance on first amendment decisions to provide standards to review
the travel restriction in Aptheker.57 The position was taken in sub-
sequent cases58 that a more stringent standard than "reasonable-
ness" should be applied where international travel is restricted.
However, as noted above, the most widely accepted position re-
garding the standards for review enunciated in Aptheker is that
the application of the "compelling government interest" test is
54. Id. at 178-79.
55. Id. at 177. In this connection, Justice Stewart reasoned that:
The statutory provision in issue. . . did not have nearly so direct an impact on
the freedom to travel internationally as occurred in the Kent, Aptheker, or
Zemel cases. It does not limit the availability of passports .... It merely with-
draws a government benefit during and shortly after an extended absence from
this country.
Id. at 177.
56. Id. at 178.
57. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 912 (9th Cir. 1973) where the court
found: "[I]t is firmly settled that the freedom to travel at home and abroad without unrea-
sonable government restriction is a fundamental constitutional right of every American cit-
izen." (emphasis added). The Davis court then tested the validity of the restriction of inter-
national travel in that case by applying the first amendment decision standards of scrutiny
employed in Aptheker. However, while the usage of the term "fundamental constitutional
right" to denote international travel might not have been appropriate, Davis can be recon-
ciled with Zemel and Aznavorian to the extent that it falls within the generally accepted
interpretation of Aptheker. See text accompanying note 20 supra. In Davis the citizen's
travel right was conditioned on the relinquishment of his fourth amendment right to be free
from an unreasonable airport search of his luggage before an international flight.
790 [Vol. 30
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limited to the specific situations where the right to travel abroad is
conditioned on the relinquishment of another constitutional
right-such as the freedom of speech or association.5 9 Therefore,
unless a prospective traveler's primary injury is an infringement on
a fundamental right, government regulation of international travel
alone need only be reasonable" or rationally based61 to pass consti-
tutional muster.
III. PASSPORT REGULATION BY THE EXECUTIVE
Legal problems regarding the restriction of international travel
are of relatively recent origin. While the United States Govern-
ment has issued passports through the State Department since the
early days of the republic, during most of our country's history,
with the exception of times of war, American citizens have been
free to enter or leave the country without the government's per-
mission.62 The traditional function of a passport was limited as
well:
The American passport is a document of identity and nationality, issued to
persons owing allegience to the United States and intending to travel or so-
journ in foreign countries. It indicates that it is the right of the bearer to
receive the protection and good offices of American diplomatic and consular
officers abroad and requests on the part of the Government of the United
States that the officials of foreign governments permit the bearer to travel or
sojourn in their territories and in case of need to give him all lawful aid and
protection. It has no other purpose.6"
However, the nature and significance of the passport changed
considerably when Congress amended the Travel Control Act in
1941 making it a crime to enter or leave the United States without
a valid passport in times of war or national emergency." In 1952
59. See note 20 supra.
60. See Nebbia v. New York, 219 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
61. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
62. See Note, Passport Control in the National Interest and Freedom to Travel, 33
TEMP. L. Q. 332, 332 (1960).
63. Id. (emphasis added). See also Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56
COLUM. L. REV. 47, 53 n.51 (1956).
64. Act of June 21, 1941, ch. 210, 55 Stat. 252-253. The rules promulgated under this
statute, 6 Fed. Reg. 6069-70, 6349, 5821 (1941), recognized the Secretary's discretion and
called for considerations of whether the use of the passport would be "prejudicial to the
interests of the United States." See also Note, Passport Control in the National Interest
and Freedom to Travel, 33 TEMP. L. Q. 332, 332 (1956). Congress enacted the Travel Con-
trol Act in 1918 which provided that, upon Presidential wartime proclamation, "it shall,
1981]
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Congress mandated that such requirements be continued by pass-
ing the Immigration and Nationality Act which authorized the
President to impose passport requirements on American citizens
during any war or national emergency he declares0 5 In 1978 Con-
gress amended the Act requiring passports for entry into and de-
parture from the United States at all times.6 8 Moreover, the Pass-
port Act of 1926 empowers the President to prescribe rules to
guide the Secretary of State in granting and issuing passports.67
Therefore, inasmuch as the enjoyment of the right to international
travel is conditioned on the possession of a valid passport, that
document, and the power of the Executive to regulate its issuance,
takes on great significance.
Administrative regulation of passports is not limited to the
revocation of passports for violations of law, 8 for fraud in procur-
ing or issuing passports,69 or on other conditions bearing on the
applicant's eligibility" to possess a passport. Area restrictions have
been a vital tool used by the Executive to curtail the international
except as otherwise provided by the President ... be unlawful for any citizen ... to depart
from or enter ... the United States unless he bears a valid passport." Act of May 22, 1918,
§§ 1 and 2, 40 Stat. 559. The dissenting Justices in Kent asserted that "[tihe legislative
history of the 1918 Act sharply indicates that Congress meant the Secretary to deny pass-
ports to those whose travel abroad would be contrary to our national security." 357 U.S. at
132 (Clark, J., dissenting).
65. Act of June 27, 1952, § 215, 66 Stat. 190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b).
66. 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b) now states:
Except as otherwise provided by the President and subject to such limitations
and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, it shall be unlaw-
ful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to
depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid passport.
67. 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1976). The authority of the Secretary of State and consular offi-
cials to issue passports "under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe for
and on behalf of the United States" has existed since the first Passport Act was adopted on
August 18, 1856, ch. 127, 11 Stat. 60-61. The quoted language has remained unchanged.
68. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 127 (1958). Justice Douglas' opinion in Kent
makes clear that unlawful conduct is itself sufficient to warrant the refusal to issue or renew
a passport, as well as its revocation by the Secretary.
69. 18 U.S.C. § 1542 provides criminal penalties for false statements made in passport
applications.
70. Under 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(a) the Secretary may deny a passport to an applicant who:
(1) is subject to an outstanding Federal warrant for arrest; (2) is subject to a court order or
conditions of parole or probation forbidding departure from the United States; (3) is subject
to a court order committing him to a mental institution; (4) is the subject of a request for
extradition or provisional arrest for extradition which has been presented to the government
of a foreign country or (5) is the subject of a subpoena in a matter involving Federal prose-
cution or a grand jury investigation of a felony.
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travel of Americans. The authority to impose area restrictions is
largely based on the power vested in the President by the Passport
Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act and his inherent respon-
sibility to conduct foreign policy.
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court upheld a travel ban to
Cuba in Zemel, where a citizen's application to have his passport
validated for travel to that country was denied pursuant to the
Passport Act of 1926.71 The Court rejected the argument that the
Act and the restriction imposed by the Executive violated the fifth
amendment by depriving citizens of the right to travel abroad
without due process and found that the Act provided the Execu-
tive with the authority to impose the area restriction.7 2 In noting
that the "liberty" to travel is not unlimited, the Court emphasized
that due process requirements are a function not only of the extent
of the government's restrictions imposed, but also of the extent of
the necessity of the restriction. 3 In the Court's view, the fear that
travel to Cuba might involve the nation in dangerous international
incidents74 embodied the requisite degree of necessity to justify
limitations on the liberty of American citizens.
In MacEwan v. Rusk, the court noted that the Secretary of
State did not seek to rely on inherent executive power alone in
promulgating the regulations in issue.75 The Secretary had also
pointed to the Passport Act of 1926 7 and the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 7 as additional sources of authority to reg-
ulate travel. The court then turned to a consideration of the ad-
ministrative history of area rdstrictions imposed by the Executive
under the Passport Act of 1926.78 Noting the President's wide de-
gree of discretion and freedom from restriction when acting in the
area of foreign affairs pursuant to the Passport Act and § 215(b) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, it was held that neither stat-
71. 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1958).
72. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 7, 14-15 (1965).
73. Id. at 14.
74. The Court noted that considerations of national security were best pointed up in
Zemel by "recalling that the Cuban Missile Crisis of October, 1962 preceded the filing of
appellant's complaint by less than two months." 381 U.S. at 16.
75. 228 F. Supp. at 310.
76. 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1958).
77. Act of June 27, 1952, § 215, 66 Stat. 190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b).
78. 228 F. Supp. at 313-14.
1981] 793
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
ute was unconstitutional.7 Rather, both were found to authorize
the challenged geographical limitations. With respect to considera-
tions of "the safety of the nation in its relations with the nations of
the world," 80 the court concluded: "Judged by the fundamental
need of self preservation, the Government's restrictions on plain-
tiff's freedom to travel is a reasonable one which. does not deprive
him of substantial due process."81
In United States v. Travis8 2 the court upheld a travel restric-
tion to Cuba which was found to be justified by conditions which
were considered "prejudicial to our country's best interests" in the
pursuance of foreign affairs.8 3 The court found that the Executive
had a constitutional, or in the alternative, a statutory basis for im-
posing area restrictions on travel to Cuba. Specifically, the court
concluded that even if the constitutional authority of the Presi-
dent to conduct foreign affairs is not sufficient to authorize the
limitations on travel to Cuba, § 215(b) of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act clearly provides the necessary authority.8 4
The Executive has imposed area restrictions where, under its
informed judgment, the atmosphere of international tension re-
quires that Americans be excluded from a specified area at a par-
ticular time for their own protection and to prevent the interfer-
ence with the proper conduct of United States foreign policy.85 The
Executive does not have unbridled discretion to withhold a pass-
port from a citizen;86 it may not restrict international travel in the
absence of congressional approval. However, the passport is itself
an instrument of foreign policy, 87 and in light of the Executive's
79. Id. at 314-15.
80. Id. at 315.
81. Id.
82. 241 F. Supp. 468 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
83. In Travis-which preceded the Supreme Court's decision in Zemel by two
years-the defendant was indicted for departing from the United States for travel to Cuba,
via Mexico, in contravention of the same State Department regulation relied on by the Sec-
retary in Zemel and MacEvan. The defendant alleged that there was no legislative history
for regulating travel on a geographical basis in general, or to Cuba in particular. It was also
alleged that 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b) delegates legislative power contrary to Article I Section 8 of
the Constitution and is vague and therefore contrary to the first and fifth amendments
thereby depriving defendant of liberty without due process of law. 241 F. Supp. at 469.
84. 241 F. Supp. at 471.
85. 228 F. Supp. at 308-09.
86. 357 U.S. at 128.
87. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 120-21; Urtetigui v. D'Arcy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692,
699 (1835).
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exclusive responsibility in that area, the courts have consistently
upheld reasonable regulation of travel designed to protect national
security.
IV. Zemel v. Rusk
Zemel s is a touchstone for any consideration of the Presi-
dent's power, acting through the Secretary of State, to impose re-
strictions on the international travel of Americans to protect the
national security and foreign policy of the United States. The sig-
nificance of that decision with respect to the source and nature of
the right to international travel has been discussed above.89 This
section will concentrate on the validity of the Executive's reliance
on statutes-most notably, the Passport Act of 1926-in restrict-
ing travel through passport regulation. It will become clear that a
fundamental notion in this regard is the great weight given to prior
administrative practice under the Passport Act of 1926 and related
legislation.
On January 3, 1961, the United States broke diplomatic and
consular relations with Cuba, and on January 16 of that year the
Secretary of State declared all outstanding passports to be invalid
for travel to or in Cuba "unless specifically endorsed for such
travel under the authority of the Secretary."9 In early 1962,
Zemel, who was a United States citizen and a holder of an other-
wise valid passport, applied to the State Department to have his
passport validated for travel to Cuba as a tourist. After this re-
quest was denied he renewed his request on October 20, 1962, stat-
ing that the purpose of the proposed trip was "to satisfy my curi-
ousity about the state of affairs in Cuba and to make me a better
informed citizen."9 1 This request was also denied because he did
not fall within the class of persons for whom the department
planned to grant exceptions for travel to or in Cuba.
Following this denial Zemel brought suit against the Secretary
and the Attorney General in federal district court, alleging that the
Passport Act of 1926 and § 215(b) of the Immigration and Nation-
88. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
89. See text accompanying notes 21-24 supra.
90. Id. at 3. The State Department contemplated granting exceptions to "persons
whose travel might be considered as being in the best interests of the United States, such as
newsmen or businessmen with previously established business interests." Id.
91. Id. at 4.
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ality Act were unconstitutional. 9 The Court limited its considera-
tion to the validity of the Passport Act of 1926.2 The Act provides:
"The Secretary of State may grant and issue passports. . under
such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe for and
on behalf of the United States and no other person shall grant,
issue or verify such passports.
9 4
The Court reasoned that the language of the Passport Act was
broad enough to authorize area restrictions and that there was no
legislative history indicating an intent to exclude such restrictions
from the grant of authority.95 The Court took this position after
recognizing that the legislative histories of the 1926 Act and its
predecessors do not expressly indicate an intention to authorize
area restrictions.9 However, the lack of express language granting
the authority to impose such restrictions was not dispositive. The
Court relied on the extensive administrative history of passport
controls to find implicit congressional approval of the Executive's
actions where explicit approval was lacking.
Accordingly, Chief Justice Warren maintained that the broad
language of the Passport Act of 1926 took on added significance
when viewed in light of the fact that in the decade preceding its
92. Id. Chief Justice Warren noted in the margin, 381 U.S. at 7, that: "Appellant in this
case does not challenge merely a 'single, unique exercise' of the Secretary's authority ....
On the contrary, this suit seeks to 'paralyze totally the -operations of an entire regulatory
scheme,' indeed, a regulatory scheme designed and administered to promote the security of
the Nation." 381 U.S. at 7.
93. Id. at 19-20. The Court determined that adjudication of the validity of § 215(b) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act was unwarranted. In view of the fact the appellants
complaint did not indicate whether he planned to travel to Cuba directly, or via one or more
countries, and that the papers filed by the Government did not indicate whether criminal
charges would be brought against Zemel for violating § 215(b), the Court stated:
Whether each or any of these gradations of fact or charge would make a differ-
ence as to criminal.liability is an issue on which the District Court wisely took
no position. Nor do we. For if we are to avoid rendering a series of advisory
opinions, adjudication of the reach and constitutionality of § 215(b) must await
a concrete fact situation.
94. 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1958).
95. 381 U.S. at 7-8. Chief Justice Warren, in writing for the Court, began consideration
of the appellant's constitutional attack on the Passport Act of 1926 by stating: "We think
the Passport Act of 1926 . . .embodies a grant of authority to the Executive to refuse to
validate the passports of United States citizens for travel to Cuba." Id.
96. Id. It is generally understood that when Congress enacted the original Passport Act
in 1856 it intended to centralize the power to issue passports in the Secretary of State and
to remove such power from the various federal, state and local officials who in the past
issued passports or similar documents. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 123 (1958);
MacEwan v. Rusk, 228 F. Supp. 306, 313 (E.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1965).
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passage the Executive had imposed both peacetime and wartime
restrictions. 7 The Chief Justice referred to restrictions imposed on
travel to Belgium in 1915 due to famine in that country. Also, from
December 9, 1914, through the end of World War I, passports were
validated for specific purposes and to specific countries only. No
passports were issued for travel to Germany and Austria until 1922
and none to the Soviet Union until 1923.98 In light of this prior
practice, the Court determined that:
The use in the 1926 Act of language broad enough to permit Executive impo-
sition of area restrictions after the Executive had several times in ... the
past openly asserted the power to impose such restrictions under predecessor
statutes containing substantially the same language, supports the conclusion
that Congress intended in 1926 to maintain in the Executive the authority to
make such restrictions."
The Court held that even in the absence of passport legisla-
tion since the passage of the 1926 Act, the post-1926 history of
Executive imposition of area restrictions as well as the pre-1926
history would be relevant to a construction of the Act favorable to
permitting area restrictions by the Executive.100
Moreover, the Court stressed that Congress, knowing of this
prior practice, left completely untouched the broad rule-making
authority granted in that Act when it passed the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952.101 Chief Justice Warren pointed out that
Kent was distinguishable because, there, the Court had been una-
ble to find an administrative practice sufficiently substantial and
consistent to warrant the conclusion that Congress had approved
of passport refusals based on the applicant's political beliefs and
associations.0 2
Kent involved a situation where the applicant was being com-
pelled to choose between his rights of association and travel. In
Zemel the Secretary refused to validate the applicant's passport
because of foreign policy considerations affecting all citizens. 103
With respect to these concerns, the Court found that the area re-
striction was supported by the weightiest considerations of na-
97. 381 U.S. at 7-8.
98. Id. at 9.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 11.
101. Id. at 12.




tional security.1 04 It is noteworthy that Zemel's suit was initiated
just after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Considering the tension with
Cuba and the fact that the Castro regime had arrested and impris-
oned Americans without charges, the Court reasoned that in light
of the President's obligation under the Hostage Law'05 to secure
the release of Americans unjustly deprived of liberty, the Secretary
was justified in concluding that travel to Cuba might incite inter-
national incidents. The Court concluded that the Constitution did
not require the Secretary to validate passports for such travel.100
The Zemel majority also found that standards for the formu-
lation of travel controls by the Executive under the Passport Act
are not impermissibly indefinite. The Court found that Congress
had consistently provided very general standards, and often the
power of unrestricted judgment, to the President in respect to sub-
jects affecting foreign relations.0 7 Due to the President's access to
information and the very nature of his office, he is much more ca-
pable than Congress to respond quickly to international emergen-
cies. Moreover, general standards of congressional delegations are
evidence that Congress recognizes its own limitations in that area.
However, the significance of Zemel with respect to the power
of the President to restrict travel of Americans for foreign policy
reasons lies in its recognition of implicit congressional approval of
such actions where explicit approval is absent. Accordingly, Chief
104. Id. at 16. See also note 74 supra.
105. The Hostage Statute, R.S. § 2001, 22 U.S.C. § 1732 provides:
Whenever it is made known to the President that any citizen of the United
States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of any
foreign government, it shall be the duty of the President forthwith to demand of
that government the reasons of such imprisonment; and if it appears to be
wrongful and in violation of the rights of American citizenship, the President
shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen, and if the release so de-
manded is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President shall use such means,
not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or
effectuate the release; and all the facts and proceedings relative thereto shall as
soon as practicable be communicated by the President to Congress.
106. 381 U.S. at 15.
107. Id. at 17. See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320
(1936). The Court there found that:
if in the maintenance of our international relations embarrassment. . . is to be
avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to
be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field
must often accord the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statu-
tory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone
involved.
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Justice Warren, near the conclusion of his opinion wrote:
We have held [in] Kent v. Dulles... and reaffirm today that the 1926 Act
takes its content from history: it authorizes only those passport refusals and
restrictions "which it could fairly be argued were adopted by Congress in
light of prior administrative practice.". .. So limited, the Act does not con-
stitute an invalid delegation."'
Thus, the prior administrative practice of area restrictions em-
bodies implicit congressional approval of the Executive's actions.
That implicit approval satisfies the Kent criteria as a delegation of
the law-making function of Congress and legitimizes regulation of
the fifth amendment liberty to travel abroad.
A major element in the reasoning of the courts in upholding
area restrictions is that they entail geographical limitations appli-
cable to everyone, without regard to individual beliefs or associa-
tions;10 9 they have been justified on the basis of foreign policy con-
siderations affecting all citizens. 1 0 However, can these same
considerations justify the revocation of the passport of an individ-
ual citizen whose worldwide travel harms national security? The
following section examines an important decison where that issue
was addressed.
V. Haig v. Agee
In Haig v. Agee"" the Supreme Court was faced with the task
of considering the validity of a State Department regulation112
which authorized the revocation of the passport of a United States
citizen on national security and foreign policy grounds. The re-
spondent, Phillip Agee, was a former employee of the Central In-
telligence Agency residing in Hamburg, West Germany. He is a
leading critic of the CIA's clandestine operations throughout the
world and has written and spoken extensively attacking American
intelligence efforts, and has purportedly revealed the identities of
certain undercover CIA agents.11s Agee was issued a passport on
108. 381 U.S. at 17.
109. 228 F. Supp. at 308.
110. 381 U.S. at 13.
111. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
112. 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) (1979).
113. Agee participated in the publication of a book entitled DmTY WORK: CIA IN WEST-
ERN EUROPE (P. Agee & L. Wolf eds. 1978). In the book's introduction Agee states that he
intended to create opposition to the CIA by publishing the identities of CIA employees. The
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March 20, 1978, with an expiration date of March 29, 1983. How-
ever, the State Department determined that Agee's activities had
caused damage to the national security and foreign policy of the
United States and, perhaps believing those activities took on spe-
cial significance because of the Iranian crisis,11' moved to revoke
his passport on December 23, 1979.115 The Secretary relied on 22
C.F.R. §§ 51.70(b)(4) and 51.71(a) which were promulgated pursu-
ant to the Passport Act of 1926. 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) provides
that:
A passport may be refused in any case in which:
The Secretary determines that the national's activities are causing or are
likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the foreign policy of
the United States.
Pursuant to these regulations,116 Agee was advised by the
State Department of his right to a hearing on the revocation of his
passport. However, he elected not to exhaust his administrative
remedies even though he was advised that the United States Con-
sulate in Hamburg was prepared on an expedited basis to receive
any evidence he desired to present. 1 7 Rather, Agee filed suit in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against then Sec-
retary of State Vance. In addition to allegations of violations of his
first and fifth amendment rights, Agee's complaint prayed that
"the court (a) declare 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.70(b)(4) and 51.71(a) are in-
valid and unconstitutional on their face and as applied to Agee and
(b) withdraw the revocation and restore Agee's passport."118 The
book contains an appendix of 415 pages that purports to list and describe a large number of
undercover CIA employees.
114. An article in the New York Post on December 17, 1979, reported that Agee had
been invited to visit Iran to serve on an "international tribunal" to judge the American
hostages held captive there. Agee denied that such an invitation had been extended. Agee v.
Musk, 629 F.2d 80, 81 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
115. Id. at 81.
116. In addition, 22 C.F.R. § 51.71(a) states: "A passport may be revoked, restricted or
limited where: The national would not be entitled to issuance of a new passport under §
51.70."
117. 629 F.2d at 91 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 92. Agee's complaint asserted that the revocation of his passport was invalid
and unlawful for the following reasons:
a. Revocation for the reasons set out in 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) has not been
authorized by Congress, and is therefore impermissible;
b. 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) is vague and overbroad, in violation of the First
Amendment;
c. In the circumstances of this case, revocation without prior notice and hearing
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district court granted Agee's motion for summary judgment based
on the determination that the challenged regulations were invalid.
The district court, without reaching other issues raised in the com-
plaint, stated: "[A]ll that is held here is that because Congress has
not acted to grant the Secretary authority, the regulation in issue
cannot be upheld."119
On appeal, a divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed the
district court's ruling. The majority found that 22 C.F.R. §
51.70(b)(4) was invalid because it was promulgated and enforced
against Agee without the requisite express or implied authorization
of Congress. 120 The Secretary contended that the Passport Act of
1926, interpreted consistently with the President's power to con-
duct foreign affairs and protect national security, authorizes the
revocaton of Agee's passport under the challenged regulation. In
response, the court stated that the Passport Act does not expressly
authorize the Secretary to deny or revoke a passport on nhtional
security or foreign policy grounds. ' 21 Next, the Secretary asserted
that past administrative and legislative practice confirms congres-
sional approval of his ability to deny or revoke passports on the
basis of "serious damage to the national security or the foreign pol-
icy of the United States. 12 2 In disposing of the Secretary's second
argument, Judge Robb, writing for the majority, reasoned that:
[T]he Secretary details only one instance in twelve years in which 22 C.F.R. §
51.70(b)(4) was employed to revoke a passport and only five refusals to pass-
port applications ... which were even arguably for national security and for-
eign policy reasons. Regardless of whether Congress was aware of these scat-
tered examples when it adopted the Passport Act in 1926 and other travel
control legislation in 1941, 1952 and 1978, such evidence hardly amounts to a
'substantial and consistent administrative practice' demonstrating implied
Congressional authorization for the challenged regulation. Until Agee's case
arose, 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) was virtually unused.12 3
violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment;
d. Revocation deprives plaintiff of liberty without due process of law, in viola-
tion of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment;
e. Defendant revoked plaintiff's passport in order to penalize and suppress his
criticism of the United States government's policies and practices, in violation of
the First Amendment.
119. Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729, 732 (D.D.C. 1980).
120. 629 F.2d at 87.
121. Id. at 85.
122. Id. at 86.
123. Id. [footnotes omitted].
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Furthermore, the majority found no merit in the proposition
put forth by the dissent that Zemel upholds passport revocation
on national security and foreign policy grounds "in the broad sense
of those terms.1124 Rather, as the majority read Zemel: "[t]he heart
of the opinion is the statement that '[t]his is therefore not like
Kent v. Dulles. . .where we are unable to find an administrative
practice sufficiently substantial and consistent to warrant the con-
clusion that Congress had implicitly approved it.' . . . [Hence,
Zemel] merely sustained .. .the imposition of area restrictions
* . .because it had been 'implicitly approved' by Congress. ' 125 The
majority then considered other statutes, regulations, proclamations
and orders relied on by the Secretary concerning the power of the
Executive to restrict or condition the issuance of passports during
times of war or national emergency. These were found to be inap-
posite on the issue of implicit authority to invoke national security
or foreign policy considerations during peacetime. 126 Thus, the
court concluded that § 51.70(b)(4) was promulgated and enforced
without express or implied authorization of Congress and was,
therefore, invalid.
Judge MacKinnon, in his lengthy dissent, argued that the pro-
vision of the Passport Act authorizing the President to issue pass-
ports "under such rules as [he] shall designate and prescribe for
and on behalf of the United States"'127 was of sufficient breadth to
authorize the questioned rule. 28
According to Judge MacKinnon, the "rule for decision" in
Agee emerges from an examination of prior administrative prac-
tice. Relying on Zemel, Judge MacKinnon asserted that:
In analyzing prior administrative practice it is erroneous to restrict the in-
quiry solely to revocations since 1968 when the regulation [22 C.F.R. §
51.70(b)(4)] reached its present form. That regulation merely codified the
Secretary's long-standing interpretation of his authority under the [Passport
Act] since the date of its original enactment in 1856. It is this consistent in-
terpretation of the Act over its entire life that constitutes the prior adminis-
trative practice that must be considered.129
124. Id. at 84.
125. Id. at n.4, quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 12 (1965).
126. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 65-154; 40 Stat. 559 (1918); Pub. L. No. 77-144, 55 Stat. 252
(1941); Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 190 (1952); Pub. L. No. 95-426, 92 Stat. 971 (1978).
127. 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1976).
128. 629 F.2d at 94 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 101 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
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The United States Supreme Court granted the government's
petition for certiorari3 0 to determine whether the Passport Act au-
thorized the revocation of Agee's passport pursuant to the chal-
lenged regulation. The Supreme Court reversed the court of ap-
peals and held that the policy announced in the State
Department's regulation was sufficiently "substantial and consis-
tent" to compel the conclusion that Congress had approved it.'"'
The Court relied primarily on Kent and Zemel to support its
finding. In doing so, however, it failed to adhere to the aspects of
those cases which counsel that only long-standing and consistent
prior administrative practice is probative of the issue of congres-
sional authorization.
13 2
The Court cut back from Kent and Zemel at the outset by
stressing that a consistent administrative construction of the Pass-
port Act of 1926 must be followed by the courts "unless there are
compelling indications that it is wrong."13  After briefly tracing the
history of the Executive's policy with regard to the regulation of
passports, the Court, citing Zemel, suggested that congressional ac-
quiescence may sometimes be found from nothing more than si-
lence in the face of an administrative policy.134 The Court, how-
ever, maintained that in Agee, as in Zemel, the inference of
130. Muskie v. Agee, 449 U.S. 818 (1980).
131. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306 (1981).
132. Id. at 310-11 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion, Justice Black-
mun noted the force in Justice Brennan's dissent to the extent that it argued that the ma-
jority opinion in Agee could not be reconciled with Kent and Zemel and that the Court was
cutting back from those cases sub silentio. Justice Blackmun went on to write:
I would have preferred to have the Court disavow forthrightly the aspects of
Zemel and Kent that may suggest that evidence of a longstanding Executive
policy or construction in this area is not probative of the issue of congressional
authorization. Nevertheless, believing that this is what the Court in effect has
done, I join its opinion.
Id.
133. Id. at 291, citing, E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 54-55
(1977), quoting, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 381 (1969), Compare Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11 (1965). It is noteworthy that the Court cited to that page of the Zemel
decision to support its holding that the Secretary's construction of the Passport Act must be
followed by the courts. One of the decisions cited in that portion of the Zemel opinion as
authority for the proposition that weight must be given to administrative interpretations
was Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1932). There, the Court
did not rely on administrative construction but held that: "[A]dministrative practice, consis-
tent and generally unchallenged, will not be overturned except for very cogent rea-
sons. . . .. 288 U.S. at 315.
134. Id. at 301.
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congressional approval was supported by more than mere congres-
sional inaction. As noted above, 13 5 Congress amended the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act in 1978 to empower the President to re-
quire passports for international travel at all times. In the same
year, Congress amended the Passport Act to place limitations on
the power of the Secretary of State to impose area restrictions.3 '
Chief Justice Burger found these amendments to be persuasive ev-
idence of congressional approval of the Secretary's interpretation
of his authority to refuse or revoke passports. The Court, relying
on Zemel, reasoned that when Congress enacted legislation relating
to passports in 1978, it left completely untouched the rule-making
authority granted in the earlier Act.13 7 Therefore, the Court pre-
sumed that Congress adopted the administrative construction."3 '
In response to Agee's argument that the only way the Execu-
tive can establish implicit congressional approval is by proof of
longstanding and consistent enforcement of the claimed power, the
Court held:
[I]f there were no occasions-or few-to call the Secretary's authority into
play, the absence of frequent instances of enforcement is wholly irrelevant.
The exercise of power emerges only in relation to a factual situation, and the
continued validity of the power is not diluted simply because there is no need
to use it ... Although a pattern of actual enforcement is one indicator of
Executive policy, it suffices that the Executive has "openly asserted" the
power at issue.139
Furthermore, the Court found its decision in Kent to be con-
sistent with this reasoning. Noting the government's policy at issue
in that case had not been enforced consistently, the majority as-
serted that the Kent Court had serious doubts as to whether there
was in reality any definite policy in which Congress could have ac-
135. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
136. Pub. L. No. 95-426, Title I, Section 124, 92 Stat. 971 (1978). The 1978 amendment
added the following language:
Unless authorized by law, a passport may not be designated as restricted for
travel to or for use in any country other than a country where armed hostilities
are in progress, or where there is imminent danger to the public health or the
physical safety of the United States travelers.
137. 453 U.S. at 301, citing, Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. at 12.
138. Id. at 301 n.50. That presumption is bottomed on the idea that when Congress
enacted the 1978 amendments without altering existing legislation, it adopted and con-
firmed the Executive's interpretation of its authority. See Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 102
(D.C. Cir. 1980)(MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
139. 453 U.S. at 302-03.
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quiesced. 140 That policy was contrasted with the policy announced
in the regulation challenged in Agee. After enumerating only four
instances where the authority embraced in that regulation was ex-
ercised, the Court concluded:
Here, by contrast, there is no basis for a claim that the Executive has failed
to enforce the policy against others engaged in conduct likely to cause serious
damage to our national security or foreign policy. It would turn Kent on its
head to say that simply because we have had only a few situations involving
conduct such as that in this record, the Executive lacks the authority to deal
with the problem when it is encountered.1
4 '
Additionally, the majority found Agee's constitutional argu-
ments to be without merit. Finding that the liberty to travel
abroad is subordinate to national security and foreign policy con-
siderations,' 2 the Court rejected Agee's claim that the revocation
of his passport violated his freedom to travel. The Court similarly
rejected Agee's arguments that the Secretary's action was intended
to penalize his exercise of free speech and that the failure to accord
him a prerevocation hearing violated his right to procedural due
process. Those fifth amendment guarantees were held to require no
more than Agee received: a statement of reasons and an opportu-
nity for a prompt postrevocation hearing.14 s
140. Id. at 303.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 306. In the majority's view, the restriction on Agee's freedom to travel was
not constitutionally impermissible inasmuch as the express language of the State Depart-
ment regulation limited its application to only those cases that involved "serious damage" to
national security or foreign policy.
143. Id. at 310. It is arguable that this holding cannot be reconciled with the Court's
decision in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). One of the factors the Court there
considered relevant in determining what process is due, in addition to the private interest
affected and the likelihood of erroneous deprivation, was the government's interest in sum-
mary procedure. In Agee, the government argued that its interest in preserving national
security justified its decison to offer a postrevocation hearing. However, it is difficult to
accept the argument that the circumstances surrounding Agee's activities justified emer-
gency action. When his passport was renewed in 1978, the Secretary was aware of his inten-
tion to disclose the identities of undercover CIA agents. Summary action would not be ap-
propriate in 1979 where the government had knowledge that Agee's activities were "harmful
to national security or foreign policy"-squarely within 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4)-for well
over a year. Even if the government's interest in curtailing Agee's activities justified the
postponement of a full-dress hearing, it did not justify dispensing with the bare rudiments
of due process recognized in Matthews and Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975): prior notice
and informal procedures ensuring an opportunity to be heard. Where those safeguards have
not been afforded, summary revocation of a passport violates the right to procedural due
process guaranteed under the fifth amendment. Brief for Respondent at 118-19, 122-24,
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The principal defect in the majority's reasoning was under-
scored in Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent.14 ' Specifically, Justice
Brennan considered the majority's reliance on Kent and Zemel to
be fundamentally misplaced. Neither of those cases, he contended,
held that long-standing Executive policy or construction is suffi-
cient proof that Congress has implicitly authorized the Secretary's
action. 145 In fact, the test used by the majority in Agee was ex-
pressly disavowed by Kent:
Under the 1926 Act and its [1856] predecessor a large body of precedents
grew up which repeat over and again that the issuance of passports is 'a dis-
cretionary act' on the part of the Secretary of State. The scholars, the courts,
the Chief Executive, and the Attorneys General, all so said. This long-contin-
ued executive construction should be enough, it is said, to warrant the infer-
ence that Congress adopted it .... But the key to that problem, as we shall
see, is in the manner in which the Secretary's discretion was exercised, not in
the bare fact that he had discretion.
14"
Justice Brennan maintained that this language requiring evi-
dence of the Executive's exercise of discretion reveals a preference
for the strongest proof that Congress knew of and acquiesced in
that authority.1 47 The Executive's authority to revoke passports
touches an area fraught with important constitutional rights and
Kent cautions that the Court should therefore "construe narrowly
all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them. 1 48 The Secre-
tary's action in Agee undeniably curtailed Agee's freedom to travel
internationally, and arguably chilled his ability to speak out
against government policies. Because of these "sensitive constitu-
tional questions," Justice Brennan stressed that the normal rule
which allows deference to be given to administrative construction
Muskie v. Agee, On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit (No. 80-83, 1980 Term) (hereinafter Brief for Respondent); see Bauer v.
Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445, 451-52 (D.D.C. 1952)(procedural due process held to require not
a judicial hearing, but at least a procedure containing elements of notice and opportunity to
be heard before reaching of judgment).
144. 453 U.S. at 310 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 314 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 314-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting, Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 124-
25 (1958).
147. 453 U.S. at 315 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Accord, Woodward v. Rogers, 344 F.
Supp. 974, 985 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also Lynd v. Rusk,
389 F.2d 940, 945-46 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
148. 357 U.S. at 129.
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is not applicable. 149 That rule, which is typically used in the con-
text of economic regulation, 150 does not require the strongest proof.
In Justice Brennan's view, only when Congress has maintained its
silence in the face of a consistent and substantial pattern of actual
passport denials or revocations can the Court be sure that Con-
gress is aware of the Secretary's actions and has implicitly ap-
proved that exercise of discretion. 151 Accordingly, Justice Brennan
concluded:
The Constitution allocates the law-making function to Congress, and I fear
that today's decision has handed over too much of that function to the Exec-
utive .... [T]he Court professes to rely on, but in fact departs from, the
two precedents in the passport regulation area, Zemel and Kent .... Be-
cause I find myself unable to reconcile those cases with the decision in this
case, . . . and because I disagree with the Court's sub silentio overruling of
those cases, I dissent.'52
The Court has clearly rejected the aspects of those cases which
govern delegations of congressional authority to the Executive
Branch in the passport revocation context.153 They have been re-
placed with reasoning which fails to take account of the impact the
Secretary's action has on the right to travel abroad.
The correct analysis is not difficult. A cursory reading of Kent
and Zemel will reveal what should have been the inquiry in Agee:
"whether there exists 'with regard to the sort of passport [revoca-
tion] involved [there], an administrative practice sufficiently sub-
stantial and consistent to warrant the conclusion the Congress had
implicitly approved it.'""
In contrast, the Court held the absence of the enforcement of
the Secretary's purported authority to be irrelevant and, citing
Zemel, claimed that it was sufficient if the Secretary has "openly
asserted" the power at issue.155 Further, the Court held that this
149. 453 U.S. at 315 (Brennan, J., dissinting).
150. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965)(deference rule applied to Secretary
of Interior's construction of an executive order as not denying his authority to issue oil and
gas leases); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966) (deference rule ap-
plied to Commission's construction of Clayton Act which prohibited price discrimination
between different purchasers of commodities of "like grade and quality").
151. 453 U.S. at 315 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 319-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
153. See text accompanying note 108 supra.
154. 453 U.S. at 314 (Brennan, J., dissenting), citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 12
(1965).
155. See text accompanying note 139 supra.
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proposition is not inconsistent with Kent.
In Kent, however, the Court decided that the criterion for es-
tablishing congressional assent by inaction is the actual imposition
of power, not the mere assertion of power.156 Administrative prac-
tice was clearly recognized as "the key to [the] problem." The ma-
jority distinguished Kent claiming that it focused on administra-
tive policy and reasoned that in light of the scattered enforcement
of the policy at issue in Kent,157 the Court doubted that there was
a definite policy in which Congress could have acquiesced.' But
the Court was cognizant of a definite policy at issue in that case.
The dispositive factor in the mind of Justice Douglas was the fact
that, because of the scattered enforcement of the Executive's pol-
icy, an administrative practice had not jelled around it.159 Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority, recognized that, despite the
broad terms used to express the Secretary of State's power over
the issuance of passports, the cases of passport refusals generally
fell into two categories: questions relating to the citizenship of the
applicant and his allegience to the United States, and cases involv-
ing criminal and unlawful conduct. Those two grounds for refusal
were
the only ones which it could fairly be argued were adopted by Congress in
light of prior administrative practice .... [The rulings] as respects Commu-
nists ... are scattered ... and not consistently of one pattern. We can say
with assurance that whatever may have been the practice after 1926, at the
time the [Passport Act] was adopted, the administrative practice, so far as
relevant here, had jelled only around the two categories mentioned.16'
Since a consistent practice of refusing passports to Commu-
nists had not been demonstrated, congressional authorization of
the regulation in issue could not be "fairly" implied and it was
therefore found to be invalid.
Notwithstanding the language of Zemel to the contrary,16 the
majority read that case to require the Executive must have only
156. See text accompanying note 146 supra.
157. See note 8 supra.
158. See text accompanying note 140 supra.
159. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 128 (1958).
160. Id.
161. In Zemel, 381 U.S. at 18, the Court expressly reaffirmed the reasoning of Kent.
See text accompanying note 108 supra. Once again, the Court limited the Secretary's au-
thority under the Passport Act to those passport refusals and restrictions which were
adopted by Congress in light of prior administrative practice.
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"openly asserted" the power at issue. 162 The absence of consistent
enforcement was deemed irrelevant. Reliance was placed on Zemel
to support the notion that "congressional acquiescence may some-
times be found from nothing more than silence in the face of an
administrative policy."163 Moreover, the 1978 amendments to the
Immigration and Nationality Act and the Passport Act, enacted in
the face of the administrative policy involved in Agee, were found
to be weighty evidence of congressional approval.'" This reading,
however, misconstrues the rationale of Zemel.
The Zemel Court focused on the Executive's interpretation of
its power to impose area restrictions. The Court's recognition of
the Executive's consistent prior practice of imposing those restric-
tions was the basis for its decision."1 5 The fact that an administra-
tive practice had jelled around the Executive's policy was the fac-
tor that distinguished Zemel from Kent. As Chief Justice Warren
wrote for the majority:
This case is therefore not like Kent v. Dulles, where we were unable to find,
with regard to the sort of passport refusal involved there, an administrative
practice sufficiently substantial and consistent to warrant the conclusion that
Congress had implicitly approved it.188
As Justice Brennan's dissent points out, the majority's reli-
ance on material expressly abjured in Kent becomes understanda-
ble when one appreciates the paucity of the recorded administra-
tive practice with respect to the policy the Secretary sought to
implement in Agee.1 1 7 The court of appeals identified only six
passport denials or revocations that were arguably based on na-
tional security or foreign policy considerations relating to an indi-
162. See text accompanying note 139 supra.
163. 453 U.S. at 300; see note 133 supra (discussion of deference given to prior adminis-
trative practice in Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co.).
164. 453 U.S. at 301.
165. In Zemel the Court did suggest that: "Congress' failure to repeal or revise in the
face of [an] administrative interpretation has been held to constitute persuasive evidence
that that interpretation is the one intended by Congress." 381 U.S. at 11. However, when
that sentence is read in the context of the reasoning of the entire opinion, it is evident that
the Court's decision was based on prior administrative practice. Indeed, a consistent and
longstanding practice had jelled around the Secretary's policy of imposing area restrictions.
See text accompanying notes 97 & 98 supra. The passage of the Immigration and National-
ity Act in 1952, in the face of this prior practice, was found to leave "completely untouched
the broad rule-making authority granted in the [Passport] Act" 381 U.S. at 12.
166. 381 U.S. at 12; see text accompanying note 154 supra.
167. 453 U.S. at 317.
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vidual.1 65 In the majority's view, the fact that there had only been
scattered enforcement of the Secretary's power did not dilute its
continued validity.169 That circular reasoning, however, cannot be
reconciled with a faithful application of the Kent-Zemel analysis.
Without a consistent administrative practice which can be shown
to have jelled around the Secretary's policy, there can be no im-
plicit congressional approval. Accordingly, without such approval
the power the Secretary seeks to assert is invalid and, therefore,
there is nothing to dilute.
The Agee Court has expressly subordinated the right to travel
abroad to national security considerations. Of course, the Execu-
tive's special responsibility over matters relating to foreign affairs
and the reluctance of the courts to interfere in that area is well
established. However, as the Court emphasized in Baker v. Carr,
17 0
"it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches
foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." When the Execu-
tive is acting in that realm its acts must not be in conflict with the
provisions of the Constitution.17 1 The invocation of the spectre of
national security cannot create powers to abridge liberty that Con-
gress has not conferred, 2 and does not override the strict rule
that the power to restrict the right to travel abroad must be nar-
rowly construed.
17 3
168. Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In 1906, a passport was denied to
a citizen who had gone to China where he became notorious as a promoter of gambling and
prostitution. In 1907, a passport was denied to Nelken Waldberg, an American citizen en-
gaged in blackmailing and "in disturbing and endeavoring to disturb the relations of this
country with foreign countries" by libeling members of the diplomatic corps in Egypt. In
1954, Colonel Hubert Julian's request for a passport was denied because his activities, which
included supplying arms to various countries, were considered prejudicial to the United
States. In 1955 two passport applications were refused because the political activities of the
applicants abroad were causing internal problems for foreign governments. In 1970 the Sec-
retary revoked the passports of two persons who sought to travel to the site of an interna-
tional airplane hijacking. In addition, as the government's brief points out, in 1948 the Sec-
retary denied Rep. Isacson's request for a passport because the congressman sought to
attend a foreign conference in support of an on-going Greek rebellion that this country was
then opposing. Brief for Petitioner at 39, Muskie v. Agee, On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (No. 80-83, 1980 Term).
169. 453 U.S. at 302.
170. 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
171. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936).
172. Brief for Respondent at 10, citing, Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952).
173. Brief for Respondent at 24; see Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958); Lynd v.
Rusk, 389 F.2d 940, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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Prior to Agee, the Court refused to readily infer that Congress
gave the Secretary of State unbridled discretion to grant or with-
hold passports. Executive actions restricting individual liberty
were not permitted in the absence of clear congressional author-
ity.174 In this connection, Justice Brennan wrote in Agee that:
The presumption is that Congress must expressly delegate authority to the
Secretary to deny or revoke passports for foreign policy or national security
reasons before he may exercise such authority. To overcome the presumption
against implied delegation, the Government must show an 'administrative
practice sufficiently substantial and consistent.'1 5
That presumption is clearly not overcome by an array of Exec-
utive Orders, regulations, instructions to consular officials and no-
tices to passport holders. Moreover, broad statements by the Exec-
utive Branch relating to its discretion in the passport area lack the
precision of definition that would follow from concrete applications
of that discretion in specific cases.
17 6
As the Court held in Zemel, the Executive's authority under
the Passport Act takes its content from history. The parameters of
the authority conferred are defined by the scope of prior practice
under the Act. Even if Congress generally approved of the Execu-
tive's overall policy, it still might disapprove with the pattern of
applying that broad rule in specific categories of cases.177 Thus, a
pattern of enforcement must be demonstrated as evidence that
174. Brief for Respondent at 59. See, e.g., Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295
(1970); NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58 (1964); Green v. McElroy, 360
U.S. 474 (1959); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283,
300 (1944).
175. 453 U.S. at 318 (Brennan, J., dissenting), citing, Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 12
(1965).
176. Id. at 315 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177. Id. In fact, as the majority pointed out in the Court of Appeals, 629 F.2d at 85 n.4,
the State Department was twice unsuccessful in seeking from Congress the power to deny or
revoke a passport on national security or foreign policy grounds. In 1958, S. 4110, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. was introduced by Sen. Greene at the request of the Secretary of State. That
bill, if enacted, would have permitted the denial of a passport to a person whose activities or
presence abroad would "seriously impair the conduct of the foreign relations of the United
States" or would "be inimical to the security of the United States." In 1966 Rep. Hays
introduced H.R. 14895, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. which was designed to authorize the Secretary
to refuse to issue or revoke a passport if he "determines that the applicant's activities
abroad are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the
foreign policy of the United States." That language is almost identical to the language of the
regulation which the Agee majority found to be implicitly approved by Congress. Both bills
died in committee.
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constitutes the strongest proof that Congress knew of and acqui-
esced in the Executive's authority.178 Prior decisions of the Su-
preme Court emphasize that only the clearest evidence of prior ad-
ministrative practice should permit the Court to consider
congressional silence to be a substitute for explicit and affirmative
action in limiting the free exercise of important rights.17 9
CONCLUSION
In the progression of cases from Kent, to Zemel, to
Aznavorian, the Supreme Court has expressed its cognizance of
the existence of the right to international travel in our constitu-
tional framework. Moreover, the Court has distinctly rejected the
notion that such a right springs from the first amendment or is the
equivalent of the fundamental right to travel among the states.
Rather, the Court has unquestionably embraced the idea that the
right to travel abroad is an aspect of the "liberty" protected by the
due process clause of the fifth amendment.
That position of the right to international travel in our scale
of rights does not necessitate that a "compelling government inter-
est" be shown to justify its infringement. The Executive is only
required to have a "rational basis" for the limitation imposed.
Where limitations on the travel right are based on legitimate na-
tional security and foreign policy considerations affecting the pub-
lic generally, the applicable standard has been met.
However, due to the important constitutional freedoms in-
volved in the passport regulation context, limitations placed on the
citizen's right to travel abroad must be made pursuant to the law-
making function of Congress. 180 If Congress has not given the Ex-
ecutive the authority to curtail that right in a specific category of
cases, the rational basis for the Executive's actions becomes
immaterial.
Congress delegated the authority to regulate the issuance of
passports to the Executive in the Passport Act of 1926. The Zemel
Court recognized that the Act confers sweeping powers on the Ex-
ecutive in that area. While the Executive is not expressly empow-
178. 453 U.S. at 315 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
179. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958); Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474,
506-07 (1959); Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 300 (1944); see also Woodward v. Rogers, 344 F.
Supp. 974, 985 (D.D.C. 1972).
180. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958).
[Vol. 30
POWER TO RESTRICT TRAVEL
ered to deny or revoke passports on national security grounds,
there is no explicit language in the Act providing that he may not
do so. 181 However, in reaffirming Kent, Zemel held that the Pass-
port Act "authorizes only those passport refusals and restrictions
'which it could [be] fairly. . . [implied] were adopted by Congress
in light of prior administrative practice . . ,,. 8 That narrow
construction of the Executive's authority was preferred because of
the restrictive effect passport regulation has on the citizen's right
to travel abroad.
In Agee, the Supreme Court has repudiated the teaching of
Kent and Zemel and has essentially overruled those cases by read-
ing them to hold that congressional approval of a State Depart-
ment regulation may be implied in the face of a long-standing ad-
ministrative policy. Notwithstanding the express language of both
Kent and Zemel to the contrary, the lack of a consistent pattern of
enforcementwas deemed irrelevant.
The Court has liberally construed a delegation of the law-mak-
ing function of Congress to the Executive under the Passport Act
of 1926. In doing so, the Court has come perilously close to, if not
arrived at, the point of giving the Secretary of State the unbridled
discretion to withhold or revoke passports for any substantive rea-
son he may choose.' By allowing the Executive to have such
sweeping discretion in an area effecting important freedoms, the
Court has handed over too much of the legislative function to the
Executive.""
"Just as the Constitution protects both popular and unpopular
speech, it likewise protects popular and unpopular travelers." " 5 By
181. See text accompanying notes 95 & 96 supra.
182. See text accompanying note 108 supra.
183. Such a result runs directly contrary to Kent, where the Court, after concluding
that an administrative practice had not jelled around the Secretary's policy at issue, 357
U.S. at 128, stressed that:
We, therefore, hesitate to impute to Congress, when in 1952 [by enacting the
Immigration and Nationality Act] it made a passport necessary for foreign travel
and left its issuance to the discretion of the Secretary of State, a purpose to give
him unbridled discretion to grant or withhold a passport from a citizen for any
substantive reason he may choose.
Id.
184. 453 U.S. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
185. Id. Justice Brennan set forth the following colloquy from the government's oral
argument, which illustrates the "potentially staggering" reach of the Secretary of State's
discretion under the majority opinion in Agee:
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cutting back from its prior decisions in the passport regulation
area, the Court has weakened that protection. Accordingly, per-
haps the most disturbing aspect of Agee is that it indicates the
Court's indifference to the constitutional dimension of the right to
travel abroad.
EDWARD P. YANKELUNAS
QUESTION: General McCree, supposing a person right now were to apply
for a passport to go to Salvador, and when asked the purpose of his journey, to
say, to denounce the United States policy in Salvador in supporting the junta.
And the Secretary of State says, I just will not issue a passport for that purpose.
Do you think that he can consistently do that in the light of our previous cases?
SOLICITOR GENERAL McCREE: I would say, yes, he can. Because we
have to vest these - The President of the United States and the Secretary of
State working under him are charged with conducting the foreign policy of the
Nation, and the freedom of speech that we enjoy domestically may be different
from that we can exercise in this context.
Id. at n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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